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  Abstract 
Historically, much effort has been expended in safety culture / climate research 
toward identifying a generic core set of components, predominately using the self-
administered questionnaire approach. However, no stable unified model has 
emerged, and much of this research has taken a methodologically top-down 
approach to depicting organisational safety culture. In light of this, the benefits of 
qualitative exploration as a precursor to and foundation for the development of 
quantitative climate measures are increasingly recognised. When grounded in the 
viewpoint of employees, qualitative data driven techniques can provide an insight 
into how those within an organisation make sense of their work environment and 
how this impacts their understanding of safety.  The current research aimed to 
address issues of ecological validity by using a qualitative approach to exploring 
and characterising military aviation employee perspectives on safety culture and risk 
taking prior to development of a quantitative measurement tool. A thematic analysis 
of twelve focus groups (N=89),conducted with military employees in a semi-
structured manner, was undertaken. This insight into how these personnel interpret 
their working world was characterised by six nameable constructs: 1. Policy and 
procedures, 2. Pressure, 3. Management ownership of safety, 4. Individual 
responsibility and risk perception, 5. Communication and 6. Organisational 
commitment. Interpretation of these constructs and implications for the future 
development of a quantitative measurment tool are discussed.  
  Introduction 
Despite intense research interest over the past three decades, the theoretical basis for 
the concept of safety culture remains indistinct (Kim & Wang, 2009). Efforts toward 
development of a generic set of components to characterise safety culture have 
proved generally unsuccessful (Guldenmund, 2007); findings and exploitation of 
safety culture research have tended to be inconsistent (Cox & Flin, 1998; Pidgeon, 
1998) and increasingly fragmented. This lack of consistency in research findings 
supports the supposition that understanding of safety has a high contextual 
specificity, where generic measure approaches will have little utility (Jeffcott et al., 
2006). The lack of a universally accepted definition of safety culture and its 
boundaries are likely to exacerbate these inconsistencies.  
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Safety culture-common constructs 
Safety culture research is dominated by psychometrically derived tools designed to 
measure a multi-dimensional construct. However, studies vary considerably in the 
number and content of these definitions (Guldenmund, 2007). In an effort to 
coalesce this research Flin et al. (2000) consider common headline variables through 
interpretation of (often idiosyncratically labelled) constructs.  Common variables 
identified include management commitment, workforce involvement, training / 
communication, employee risk perception, nature of the work environment and 
policy / procedures. Many safety climate questionnaire tools have taken a 
methodologically top down approach to development, often based on already 
existing measures or constructs (Cox and Flin, 1998), which often date back to 
seminal work in this area (Zohar, 1980).  Top-down measurement development has 
been criticised for running the risk of imposing theoretical concepts and  
underplaying the potential for social difference (Seo et al., 2004), with negative 
implications for instrument validity which has proved elusive for many instruments 
across sectors or professions (Guldenmund, 2000).  
The benefits of data driven approaches, grounded in employee perspectives, are 
claimed to have the potential to cast light on how factors impact culture, and in what 
ways identified variables influence employee decision making and behaviour in 
relation to risk (Cox & Flin, 1998; Weyman et al., 2006).  There are, as yet, only a 
small number of published studies using qualitative method (Jeffcott et al., 2006; 
Blazsin & Guldenmund, 2015; Nordlof et al., 2015), however the rich detail in these 
provides contextual insight into understanding of safety culture within their 
respective organisations.  
Safety culture in aviation 
Aviation has received a great deal of interest in this area (McDonald et al., 2000; 
Falconer, 2006; Petterson & Aase, 2008; Goodheart & Smith, 2014), however even 
within this industry there is a lack of convergence on common constructs (O’Conner 
et al., 2011). Understanding military attitudes to safety and risk are important given 
the requirement for these personnel to have a positive attitude toward safety yet 
willing to take risks (Borjessin et al., 2011). This is dissimilar to civilian life, in 
which much of the safety culture research is grounded, although many of the 
regulatory and legislative requirements may be common to both. The interplay of 
military requirements and regulatory policy may result in different interpretations 
of safety than have previously been identified in civilian studies (Turner & Tennant, 
2009). The Defence Aviation Environment (DAE) has undergone considerable 
changes in recent years as a result of recommendations made in the Nimrod Review 
(Haddon Cave, 2009), a detailed investigation into the loss of the Nimrod MR2 
XV230 aircraft in 2006. Implementation of these recommendations has resulted in 
changes to risk ownership structures, processes associated with safety management, 
regulatory authorities and error management (Ministry of Defence, 2012) while 
safety culture has become a key focus as a result. 
Materials and methods 
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The aim of the current research was to to use qualitative methods to enhance insight 
into defining influences on safety culture and risk taking within a military aviation 
context and to use this as the basis for the development of a  more ecologically 
grounded and valid quantitative safety climate measurement tool. The study 
reported here relates to findings from initial foundation qualitative research. 
Study design 
An exploratory, qualitative approach was adopted for the current study. As the focus 
was on shared understanding of factors related to safety, focus groups were selected 
as the method of enquiry. This method has several advantages; it provides insight 
into shared sense making, norms, values and attitudes, facilitates group dynamics to 
allow synergistic amalgamation of ideas (Kitzinger & Barbour, 1999) and allows 
the complexity of employee experience to be captured (Jeffcott et al., 2006). A semi 
structured interview schedule was developed through discussion with subject matter 
experts (SMEs) within the organisation, as well as the findings from previous studies 
and the wider safety culture / climate literature. 
Participants and recruitment strategy 
The study was undertaken with ethical approval from both the Ministry of Defence 
Research Ethics Committee (MODREC) and the University of Bath. Participants 
were an opportunity sample of military personnel attending safety training courses. 
Twelve focus group sessions were conducted, lasting between forty five and sixty 
minutes. The sample (N=89) was predominately aircrew (such as pilots) and aircraft 
maintainers (known broadly as engineers), with a small number of Air Traffic 
Control (ATC) personnel. Details of the samples can be seen in Table 1.  
Table 1. Trade and number of participants in focus group sessions 
Focus group Trade Number of participants 
1 Engineer 9 
2 Aircrew 8 
3 Engineer 6 
4 Aircrew 9 
5 Engineer/Air Traffic Control 5 
6 Aircrew 9 
7 Aircrew 7 
8 Engineer 6 
9 Engineer 6 
10 Engineer 5 
11 Engineer 11 
12 Engineer 8 
 
In accordance with the ethical protocol, participants were volunteers, fully briefed 
prior to consent, able to withdraw at any time and assured confidentiality. The main 
author facilitated the focus groups, and an assistant took notes. 
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Data analysis 
The sessions were audio recorded and transcribed verbatim. Thematic analysis was 
selected to explore the data as it is well suited to identifying, analysing and reporting 
patterns in the data (Braun and Clarke, 2006) while accommodating interpretation 
of the research topic (Boyatzis, 1998). The analysis was both empirically and 
theoretically driven, with all themes being grounded in data provided by participants 
(Biggs et al., 2013). 
The analysis process was guided by methods described by Braun and Clarke (2006). 
Steps were reviewed iteratively and the method of constant comparative analysis 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967) was used to encourage conceptualisation of the 
relationships between the data (Thorne, 2000). The transcripts were imported into 
the Nvivo 9 software where initial analysis and coding of the data on a small number 
of transcripts (N=2) were undertaken independently by the first author and an 
assistant, after which differneces in classification and interpretation were discussed 
to challenge assumptions. Iterative cycles of grouping initial codes into clusters and 
subsequently themes resulted in a thematic framework. On completion of this 
thematic framework, an inter-rater reliability assessment was undertaken on sample 
transcripts (N=3). Cohen’s kappa statistic was used to assess the degree of 
concordance which resulted in a coefficient of 0.62. The definition and boundaries 
of the themes was revisited, with a subsequent assessment returning a coefficient of 
0.72. 
Results & Discussion 
Thematic analysis of the focus group data resulted in identification of six nameable 
themes that are considered to characterise how these military aviation employees 
articulate headline influences on workplace safety culture and risk taking (Table 2). 
Each theme embodied a number of related facets which will be discussed in more 
detail. Illustrative quotes from the focus group sessions are identified in “italics”, 
with clarification notes in (parentheses) and the author’s occupational group in 
[square brackets]. 
Table 2. Themes and sub themes 
Theme Sub-theme  
Policy & procedures Legitimacy 
Barriers  
Pressure Organisational pressure 
Interdependence of functions 
Management ownership of safety  Supervisory/line management 
Senior management  
Individual responsibility & risk perception Camaraderie  
Perceived consequences 
Communication Reporting 
Just culture 
Organisational commitment  Pride 
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Policy and procedures 
Respondents portrayed clode adherence to policy and procedures as an accepted and 
strongly socially legitimised facet of the workplace context, playing a key role in 
safety perception and implementation throughout the organisation. This theme was 
apparent in all twelve focus groups and is considered to be characterised by two sub-
themes, legitimacy and barriers. Respondents appeared to see policy and procedures 
as necessary and important, with adherence and compliance being imperative, this 
was interpreted as these having legitimacy.  Sentiments expressed indicated that 
their legitimacy was enhanced by the belief that "many of these rules….have been 
brought about because of accidents happening in the past, i.e. lessons learned" 
[engineer]. This acceptance of the procedures was interpreted as positive, given the 
highly procedural nature of much of the work “nearly everything that we do in 
aviation is very procedural” [aircrew] which requires rule compliance to support 
the safety strategies (Hopkins, 2010). This is plausibly reinforced by the high 
consequences of failure and the cognitive availably of repercussions. 
Despite the high legitimacy afforded, respondents juxtaposed this with descriptions 
of barriers to compliance. The most common of these was the claimed difficulty in 
keeping up to date with policy and procedures “I don’t think everybody necessarily 
knows exactly what procedures or what policies or regulations are necessarily 
applicable..” [engineer]. This was attributed to the high volume and perceived 
constant alteration, with information spread across several sources “Each week 
more policy comes out and everyone’s expected to read it and take it in” [engineer]. 
As a result, respondents portrayed themselves as vulnerable, in the sense of blame 
and accountability arising from inadvertent non-compliance. A lack of knowledge 
may lead to unintentional violations that are unrelated to inappropriate action or lack 
of motivation (Laurence, 2005), yet this has received little attention in the literature 
(Dahl, 2013).  
 
Difficulties in compliance were also attributed to procedures that were lagging 
behind technical advances, changes that “hadn’t been acted on” [engineer], and 
contradictory procedures which necessitate “applying common sense” [engineer] 
were identified as further barriers. Involvement of frontline personnel in rule 
creation/alteration encourages compliance (Blazsin & Guldenmund, 2015). Changes 
should be acted on promptly as where inadequate, incompatible procedures are not 
changed in a flexible manner, locally accepted ways of working may result. This 
was evident in this organisation “A lot of it has become the norm so you don’t think 
about it…” [engineer] which is a concern as this embodies an “unknown risk” 
[engineer], leading to situations where people “may not really consider the 
implications” [engineer] of what they are doing. Situations such as these may 
increase the potential for error and unintended circumstances (Reason, 1997) yet 
little is understood about how these ‘norms’ develop or can be managed.  
 
Pressure 
A general tension or trade-off between productivity and safety objectives has been 
identified in diverse industries (Weyman et al., 2003; O’Dea et al., 2010) and this 
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has been a common thread in safety climate assessments (Flin et al., 2000).  
However, the definitions and sources of pressure vary between industries, and how 
these are communicated and interpreted may be context specific.  In the current 
study non-compliance was generally seen as meeting with strong cultural and 
institutional disapproval “I don’t think many people, if any, would knowingly do that 
(not adhere to standard operating procedures) in this day and age” [Aircrew], yet 
still two main sources of pressure were cast as being at odds with this. The first of 
these was allied to achieving organisational demands (called capability which can 
include defence, search and rescue, training and humanitarian efforts). The high 
perceived importance of capability was considered to be a shared group experience 
between respondents given the perceived common awareness that “we are in the 
military-we have to be operationally effective, we have to have that capability” 
[aircrew]. This pressure was considered to be implicit as personnel cast their 
experience as being highly conscious of their military purpose “the reason we’re 
here is defence of.. the country”. Military work can be considered an outlier in 
comparison to civilian organisations, and the acceptance of risk may differ in 
training and routine tasks to combat activities (Turner & Tennant, 2009). This is 
arguably likely to affect views on safety that may not be reflected in the, 
predominately civilian, published research literature. 
During routine tasks, safety was presented as often creating additional time pressure; 
“a lot of this policy adds time on to jobs” [engineer] both at team and individual 
levels, which was reinforced through management.  For engineers particularly, 
failure to achieve these goals was described as risking reputational damage for 
individuals“people believe they have to do a job in a certain time otherwise they 
will be looked at in a negative light” [engineer] but also at a team and organisational 
level. This was evidenced in descriptions of the military ‘can-do’ attitude which has 
been observed elsewhere (Bosak et al., 2013). This attitude was presented as 
pervasive despite management directive to the contrary “now the (Senior 
management) has turned around and said I don’t want you to have a can-do 
attitude”. This may represent a difference between senior management command 
and local management implementation, or could highlight self-fulfilling attitudes, 
both of which would benefit from management consistency and open 
communication. This type of pressure may lead to reduced attention to rules that are 
seen to impede progress, potentially circumventing a safety barrier (Bosak et al., 
2013). Furthermore, in cases where a negative outcome does not occur, this may be 
incorrectly perceived as ‘safe’ and adopted again in future.  
Management ownership of safety 
A key construct in many safety culture assessments, good management involvement 
in safety has been shown to have a positive relationship with safety behaviours 
(Cheyne et al., 1998; Flin et al., 2000). The current study inductively identified two 
levels of management within respondent accounts. These two levels were the 
supervisory / line management level, and the senior management level, characterised 
by contrasting expectations and respondent experiences. Supervisors were seen as 
most influential in day to day business, being role models for appropriate behaviour 
“The different techniques that people have to supervise and the way you’ve been 
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taught and the procedures that they follow are passed on (to subordinates)” 
[engineer] and passing on normative behaviour. These individuals are important in 
determining potential safety performance in personnel, making individuals “more 
comfortable (about) being able to speak up” [engineer]. Positive management 
behaviours have been seen to be important in determining compliance (Mearns et 
al., 1997; Simard and Marchand, 1997). 
Contrastingly, senior management ownership was only discussed through 
impressions of primacy given to human factors and safety training and safety 
promotional material – this was cast positively as senior management support. 
Findings from other sectors suggest that senior management are under pressure to 
show that they are dedicated to safety (Biggs et al., 2013) and ‘walk the walk’, not 
just ‘talk the talk’.  
Individual responsibility and risk perception 
Analysis of respondent accounts of their experiences showed a high, often 
intrinsically motivated, personal accountability for safety of oneself and one’s 
colleagues “we’re our brother’s keeper and look out for each other” [aircrew] as 
well as the general public. Of note were references to small team size and general 
familiarity with colleagues as drivers of this safety awareness. This was interpreted 
as feelings of camaraderie – a sense of looking out for each other. Although this 
intrinsic motivation presented as strong, extrinsic motivation of legal responsibility 
for actions was also cast as important; personnel perceived personal liability as more 
pertinent due to changes borne out from the Nimrod report (Haddon Cave,  2009).  
Respondent experiences suggested an inherent acceptance that aviation is a high risk 
activity and has the potential for severe consequences. Similar themes were 
observed in aviation personnel by Patankar (2003), suggesting an overarching 
industry wide risk perception may exist. Interestingly, while respondents accepted 
their involvement in high risk activities, this was cast as being managed through 
“due risk assessment” [engineer]; military activities are weighed against potential 
gains to operational capability (Turner & Tennant, 2009). This concept of 
organisationally determined acceptable risks has not yet been discussed in the 
literature-further investigation may provide insights into understanding of safety 
culture. 
Communication 
Communication about safety issues was presented by respondents as required to 
encourage organisational learning, such as using reported mistakes as “really good 
learning tools” [engineer]. However, despite acknowledged management 
encouragement, some respondents claimed a “stigma of being labelled” if they were 
to self-report mistakes. The embarrassment of admitting a mistake may affect 
behaviour, even in employees who acknowledge the importance of reporting 
(Nordlof et al. , 2015). In Defence Aviation, the concept of a ‘just culture’ (treating 
individuals in a fair and consistent manner and applying appropriate sanctions) is 
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promoted in order to encourage reporting - this concept has been widely encouraged 
and promulgated in communications in the study organisation.    
It was this issue of ‘just culture’ in which it was identified that perceptions may 
diverge along functional boundaries. Aircrew generally agreed that “we know we 
must admit a mistake, that we must learn from it and that we will only get punished 
if we have absolutely contravened regulation” [aircrew] while many aircrew 
suggested that this may be different for the engineering function. This was partially 
supported, with a suggestion that the just culture was “more alive and well at the 
top of the chain, but less so at the bottom” [engineer], but this discussion did not 
extend to the junior engineers. Given the institutional requirement to report safety 
related incidents, it is unlikely that people would admit to under-reporting, yet there 
are indications that perceptions of the just culture concept may not be homegenous. 
This concept of sub cultures is increasingly being acknowledged in safety culture 
research (Antonsen, 2009), with cultural boundaries being identified between 
functional departments or specialisations (Gherardi et al., 1998; Mearns et al., 1998; 
Richter and Koch, 2004).  
Organisational commitment 
The final identified theme was named organisational commitment and was defined 
as the shared sense of safety purpose between employees, a sense of belonging to a 
group. This manifested through discussions about pride in the safety reputation of 
the organisation “I think we all see it as our heritage…and we would never try and 
put a negative view on it” [aircrew] where safety was cast as an integral part of the 
organisation which was instilled early on in personnel training “it’s been so 
engrained from the time that you join that it’s something that becomes second nature 
to you” [engineer]. This was summarised by one respondent suggesting that “Safety 
reputation…is all important- we think we’re reasonably safe, but not complacent”.  
Similar findings have not been explored in many safety culture measurement tools, 
however a similar construct named ‘Pride in company’ was found by Patankar 
(2003) using statements such as ‘I am proud to work for this company’ and ‘My 
company is the best in the business’. 
Conclusion 
The grounded approach to characterising safety culture in a military aviation 
population has provided insights that support the requirement for contextualisation 
of safety culture. These insights will be used to support the development of an 
ecologically valid quantitative safety climate measurement tool. In contrast to other 
sectors, policy and procedures were shown to have high legitimacy, despite some 
organisational barriers to compliance being identified. Exploration of employee 
interpretation of the priority of organisational goals and potential sub-cultural 
differences will be facilitated through a more quantitative tool to determine the 
generalizability of these findings to a wider sample. The identified themes would 
benefit from future application of psychometric techniques to test the suitability of 
novel themes (such as the high level of commitment to organisational safety 
reputation and integration of safety awareness throughout the military aviation 
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career) and previously established themes (such as management commitment and 
policy & procedures) as constructs underpinning safety culture. 
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